Use case · confidentiality
Enclessa group direct messages are end-to-end encrypted with MLS as specified in RFC 9420, and there is no administrator override: the server holds ciphertext, no organisation administrator can add themselves to the conversation, and nothing outside the group can produce its contents. That is what makes them usable for a board discussion, a works-council conversation or a legally privileged exchange, where the risk is not an external attacker but a colleague with an administrator account.
Open betaThe platform is being built in the open, so parts of it are not there yet, behaviour changes between releases, and no availability figure is committed while it is in beta. What is still being built.
A small group has to discuss something that the rest of the organisation, and specifically the people who administer its software, must not be able to read. A board discussing a transaction, a works council doing what the law requires it to do independently of the employer, a partner discussing a matter under privilege. The threat is internal and ordinary: an administrator account, a subpoena served on the operator, a routine export.
In most platforms a private channel is a row somebody with enough access can change. The confidentiality rests on a permission that an administrator can grant themselves, and on the assumption that nobody will.
A works council using a platform the employer operates is relying on the employer not to look. That is an uncomfortable arrangement to write down, and in Germany it is the reason these conversations often end up on personal phones.
The features that make a platform auditable — export, retention, discovery — are the same features that make a confidential discussion readable by whoever operates them.
The conversation moves to a consumer messenger on personal devices, where the organisation has no record of what was agreed, no way to remove somebody who leaves, and no answer at all when somebody asks where the data went.
Group direct messages are always end-to-end encrypted. This is not a setting somebody could have failed to switch on, and not something an administrator can change afterwards — there is no mechanism, in the product or in the database, to make a group direct message readable by the server.
A room’s mode is fixed when it is created and displayed in the room itself, so nobody has to take it on trust or infer it from a settings page. Encrypted rooms are marked, and the marking is the same everywhere.
Membership of an encrypted conversation is membership of a cryptographic group, so adding somebody is a visible event to everybody in it. There is no silent addition, no shadow member and no compliance reader that the group cannot see.
Use ordinary managed channels for the work that has to be searchable, retained and exportable, and keep the confidential discussion in the encrypted room. Both exist in the same product, and which one you are in is always visible.
None in particular. End-to-end encrypted direct messages and group direct messages are on every plan including Free, which means a works council or a board can use this without a purchase decision and without the organisation paying for their confidentiality.
Compare the plansCreate a workspace in a couple of minutes. It is yours at your-team.enclessa.app, hosted in the European Union, with encrypted direct messages from the first one you send.
Open beta. Free plan, no payment card to start.